Center for Curriculum and Transfer Articulation



Smart Grid and Distribution System Security

Course: CIS275DB Lec + Lab 3 Credit(s) 4 Period(s) 3.7 Load

Course Type: Occupational

First Term: **2014 Fall** Final Term: **Current**

Load Formula: S-Standard

Description: Information security risks associated with a modernized electric power grid. Provides detailed overview of the modern electric power grid including its components, functions and features. Focuses on security risks related to distribution automation and smart meters including smart grid components, interfaces and interactions between components with differing levels of security. Architecture, protocols and security impacts associated with this infrastructure are stressed.

Requisites: Prerequisites: CIS274DA or permission of Instructor.

MCCCD Official Course Competencies

- 1. Explain what the importance of the smart grid (I, III, V).
- 2. Explain the security implications of using automation to control the grid (I, III, V).
- 3. Describe the risks associated with automation of electric grid components and why the security posture of these systems is important (II, V).
- 4. Explain threats to smart grid including vulnerabilities and impacts that increase its risk profile (II, V).
- 5. Describe how smart grid components interact with one another and how to apply security controls to protect these interfaces (III, IV).

MCCCD Official Course Outline

- I. Elements of a Modern Grid
- A. Customer enablement
- 1. Energy Services Interface
- 2. Programmable Communicating Thermostat
- 3. Customer Premise
- 4. Load Control and Smart Appliances
- 5. Plug-in Electric Vehicle and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment
- 6. Mobile HAN
- 7. Home Area Networking
- 8. Smart Meters
- 9. Neighborhood Area Networking
- 10. Smart Meter Collectors
- 11. Wide Area Networking
- 12. Utility DMZ
- 12 Hood and Custom

- 13. Head elid System
- 14. Meter Data Management System
- 15. Back office
- B. Distribution Automation
- 1. Utility Field Sensors
- 2. Utility Distribution and Feeder Meters
- 3. Utility Field Controllers
- 4. Local Access Network
- 5. Sensor/Meter Aggregator
- 6. Wide Area Network
- 7. Data Center Access
- 8. Sensor Head-End
- 9. Meter Head-End
- 10. Distribution SCADA
- 11. Back Office
- C. Transmission Automation
- 1. Energy Management System
- 2. Energy System Display
- 3. Automatic Generation Control
- 4. Supervisory Control
- 5. Contingency Reserve Management
- 6. Interchange Scheduling
- 7. SCADA Master Terminal
- 8. SCADA Front-End Processor
- 9. Synchrophasors
- 10. Relays
- 11. Programmable Logic Controllers
- 12. Remote Terminal Units
- 13. Control Center
- D. Smart Grid Benefits
- 1. Enables Consumer Participation
- 2. Accommodates All Generation & Storage Options
- 3. Enables New Markets
- 4. Meets Power Quality Needs
- 5. Optimizes Assets & Operates Efficiently
- 6. Self Heals
- 7. Resists Attack
- II. Smart Grid Threats
- A. Nation States
- B. Hackers
- C. Terrorists/Cyber Criminals
- D. Organized Crime
- E. Other Criminal Elements
- F. Industrial Competitors
- G. Disgruntled Employees
- H. Careless Poorly Trained Employees
- III. Smart Meter Logical Reference Model
- A. Operations
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- 2. Transmission SCADA
- 3. Distribution Operator
- 4. Distributed Generation and Storage Management
- 5. Distribution Engineering
- 6. Distribution Management System
- 7. Work Management System
- 8. Transmission Engineering
- 9. Outage Management
- 10. Load Management
- 11. Customer Portal
- 12. Customer Service Representative
- 13. Customer Information System
- 14. AMI Head End
- 15. Meter Data Management System
- 16. ISO/RTO Operations
- 17. Metering/Billing/Utility Back office
- 18. Bulk Storage Management
- 19. Energy Management System
- B. Service Provider
- 1. Billing
- 2. Third Party
- 3. Aggregator / Retail Energy Provider
- 4. Energy Service Provider
- C. Markets
- 1. ISO/RTO Wholesale Market
- 2. Energy Market Clearing House
- D. Transmission
- 1. Phasor Measurement Unit
- 2. Transmission RTU
- 3. Transmission IED
- E. Bulk Generation
- 1. Plant Control System
- F. Distribution
- 1. Field Crew Tools
- 2. Geographic Information System
- 3. Distribution RTUs
- 4. Distributed Intelligence Capabilities
- 5. Distribution Data Collectors
- 6. Distribution Sensors
- G. Customer
- 1. Customers
- 2. Customer Premise Display
- 3. Customer Appliances and Equipment
- 4. Meter
- 5. Sub meter
- 6. Electric Vehicle
- 7. Customer DER
- O Motor/Coo Motoro

- o. vvaler/Gas ivieters
- 9. Energy Services/HAN Gateway
- 10. Customer Energy Management System
- IV. Securing Smart Grid Security
- A. Access Control
- 1. Remote Access
- 2. Account Management
- 3. Access Enforcement
- 4. Information Flow Enforcement
- 5. Separation of Duties
- Least Privilege
- 7. Unsuccessful Login Attempts
- 8. System Use Notification
- 9. Previous Logon Notification
- 10. Concurrent Session Control
- 11. Session Lock
- 12. Remote Session Termination
- 13. Permitted Actions without Identification and Authentication
- 14. Access Control for Portable and Mobile Devices
- 15. Control System Access Restrictions
- 16. Publically Accessible Content
- 17. Passwords
- 18. Wireless Access
- B. Configuration Management
- 1. Baseline Configuration
- 2. Configuration Change Control
- 3. Monitoring for Configuration Changes
- 4. Access Restrictions for Configuration Change
- 5. Configuration Settings
- 6. Configuration for Least Functionality
- 7. Component Inventory
- 8. Factory Default Settings Management
- C. Identification and Authentication
- 1. Identifier Management
- 2. Authenticator Management
- 3. User Identification and Authentication
- 4. Device Identification and Authentication
- Authenticator Feedback
- D. System and Communications Protection
- 1. Communications Partitioning
- 2. Security Function Isolation
- 3. Information Remnants
- 4. Denial of Service Protection
- 5. Resource Priority
- 6. Boundary Protection
- 7. Communication Integrity
- 8. Communication Confidentiality
- 9. Trusted Path
- 10 Cryptographia Kay Establishment

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- 11. Use of Validated Cryptography
- 12. Transmission of Security Parameters
- 13. Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
- 14. Mobile Code
- 15. System Connections
- 16. Message Authenticity
- 17. Secure Name/Address Resolution Service
- 18. Fail in Known State
- 19. Thin Nodes
- 20. Honeypots
- 21. Operating System-Independent Applications
- 22. Confidentiality of Information at Rest
- 23. Heterogeneity
- 24. Application Partitioning
- E. System and Information Integrity
- 1. Flaw Remediation
- 2. Malicious Code Protection
- Security Alerts and Advisories
- 4. Security Function Verification
- 5. Information Input Validation
- V. Smart Grid Risk
- A. Privacy Concerns
- 1. Fraud
- 2. Personal Behavior Patterns
- 3. Unauthorized Surveillance
- 4. Non-Grid Commercial Use of Data
- B. Smart Grid and Electric Delivery Regulations
- 1. Alabama Title 37 Public Utilities
- 2. Arizona 42-5063
- 3. California General Provisions and Definitions
- 4. Colorado Article 25 Public Utility Commission Power to regulate utilities
- 5. Connecticut Chapter 98 and 101
- 6. Delaware Title 26 Public Utilities
- 7. District of Columbia Title 34
- 8. Florida Title 27 Regulated Utilities
- 9. Georgia Article 2 and 6
- 10. Hawaii 269-16 Regulation of utility rates
- 11. Idaho Title 61
- 12. Illinois Chapter 220
- 13. Indiana title 8
- 14. Kansas 66-101
- 15. Kentucky Title 24 Public Utilities Generally
- 16. Louisiana Public Utilities Definition
- 17. Maine Public Utilities
- 18. Maryland Statute 1-101 Definitions
- 19. Michigan Chapter 460
- 20. Minnesota Chapter 216-217
- 21 Montone Title 60 Dublic Litilities and Carriers

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- 22. Nevada Title 58 Chapter 701
- 23. New York Electric Utility Cooperatives and Corporations
- 24. North Dakota Title 49
- 25. Ohio Chapter 743
- 26. Oregon Title 57
- 27. Pennsylvania Title 66
- 28. Rhode Island Title 39
- 29. South Carolina Article 3 Electric Systems
- 30. South Dakota Title 49
- 31. Tennessee Title 65 Chapter 4 Public Utility Commission Authority
- 32. Texas Code Title 2
- 33. Utah Title 54
- 34. Virginia Title 56 Section 580
- 35. Washington Title 54
- 36. Wisconsin Chapter 196
- 37. Wyoming Title 37
- C. Smart Grid Vulnerabilities
- 1. Code Quality Vulnerabilities
- 2. Authentication Vulnerabilities
- 3. Authorization Vulnerabilities
- 4. Cryptographic Vulnerabilities
- 5. Environmental Vulnerabilities
- 6. Error Handling Vulnerabilities
- 7. General Logic Errors
- 8. Business Logic Vulnerabilities
- 9. Logging and Auditing Vulnerabilities
- 10. Path Vulnerabilities
- 11. Protocol Errors
- 12. Range and Type Error Vulnerabilities
- 13. Sensitive Data Protection Vulnerabilities
- 14. Session Management Vulnerabilities
- 15. Concurrency, Timing and Synchronization Vulnerabilities
- 16. Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities
- D. Smart Grid Risks
- 1. People
- 2. Training
- 3. Insufficient Background Checks
- 4. Inadequate Policies
- 5. Inadequate Patch/Firmware Processes
- 6. Inadequate Change Management
- 7. Inadequate Integrity Checking
- 8. Inadequate Network Segmentation
- 9. Inappropriate Protocol Selection
- 10. Weaknesses in Authentication Process or Keys
- 11. Insufficient Redundancy
- 12. Unnecessary System Access
- 13. Inadequate Audits
- 14 Inadequate Discotor Becovery

- 14. Inauequate Disaster Recovery
- 15. Inadequate Risk Management
- 16. Inadequate Incident Response
- E. Use Cases

Last MCCCD Governing Board Approval Date: June 24, 2014

All information published is subject to change without notice. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of information presented, but based on the dynamic nature of the curricular process, course and program information is subject to change in order to reflect the most current information available.